{"id":212804,"date":"2026-06-05T22:04:49","date_gmt":"2026-06-05T22:04:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/playing-host-to-putin-and-trump-china-sends-a-message-its-now-in-the-drivers-seat-the-conversation\/"},"modified":"2026-06-05T22:04:49","modified_gmt":"2026-06-05T22:04:49","slug":"playing-host-to-putin-and-trump-china-sends-a-message-its-now-in-the-drivers-seat-the-conversation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/playing-host-to-putin-and-trump-china-sends-a-message-its-now-in-the-drivers-seat-the-conversation\/","title":{"rendered":"Playing host to Putin and Trump, China sends a message \u2013 it\u2019s now in the driver\u2019s seat – The Conversation"},"content":{"rendered":"

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It\u2019s been quite a week for Beijing, with back-to-back visits by the leaders of the United States and Russia. Chinese President Xi Jinping has had his hands full with hosting duties, gun salutes, photo opportunities and high-level talks.
Each visit was important in its own way. US President Donald Trump\u2019s state visit was his first to Beijing since 2017<\/a>. It came at a moment of strained China-US relations, with the US at war in the Middle East and its foreign policy undergoing a massive transformation under Trump.
For Putin, it was his 25th official visit to China. The trip was intended to further consolidate the China\u2013Russia strategic alignment amid global uncertainty. Putin was also keen to secure China\u2019s continued economic lifeline and diplomatic cover as its war with Ukraine grinds on.
And while the timing of the back-to-back visits should not be over-interpreted \u2013 Moscow says there was \u201cno connection<\/a>\u201d between the two \u2013 they do reveal a deeper structural shift in global politics.
First, the United States is clearly no longer the most important country in China\u2019s strategic worldview \u2013 and Beijing is increasingly willing to show it.
This was visible in Xi\u2019s posturing and negotiating style with Trump. From his rather distant handshake to his dominant body language throughout their meeting, Xi sent a message: Washington has a limited ability to influence Beijing anymore.
The modest outcomes of their summit reinforced this dynamic. Trump left China without a formal deal, a press conference or a joint communiqu\u00e9. Nor was there a breakthrough on either Iran or Taiwan<\/a>.
Putin, meanwhile, met his \u201cgood and old friend<\/a>\u201d Xi and took home some 20 agreements ranging from trade to technology.
The most striking, if not unsettling, moment was Xi\u2019s invocation<\/a> of the \u201cThucydides Trap\u201d during his meeting with Trump. This is the idea that a rising power inevitably threatens an established one, risking war.
Xi asked a pointed question:
Can China and the United States transcend the so-called \u2018Thucydides Trap\u2019 and forge a new paradigm for major-power relations?
Xi has used this concept before, but his directness this time sent a warning: the US risks creating a major crisis if it continues to rely on a containment strategy to counter China\u2019s rise.
In short, Beijing used the Trump visit to signal confidence, autonomy and the fact that Washington is not the only capital that matters to China.
Second, the China\u2013Russia alignment has become less equal, but it has gained greater strategic depth. And Beijing is now using it to put pressure on the US leadership.
During a private garden stroll through the highly secretive Zhongnanhai leadership compound last week, Trump asked whether Xi often brings other world leaders there. Xi replied<\/a> that such visits are \u201cextremely rare,\u201d but added that \u201cPutin has been here\u201d.
The innocent reading of this exchange is that Xi was simply noting the depth of his personal rapport with Putin. But in the current geopolitical context, it also served as a subtle reminder to Trump that China\u2019s \u201cno limits\u201d partnership<\/a> with Russia is not rhetorical. Beijing was signalling Moscow remains a privileged strategic partner \u2013 and that China has options.
The deeper message is this: if Washington seeks to isolate China, Beijing can lean even more heavily on its relationship with Moscow.
China does not need to help Russia \u201cwin\u201d in Ukraine to make this point. What matters is that Beijing has the ability \u2013 if it chooses \u2013 to bolster Russia\u2019s war effort through economic, diplomatic and long-term technological and energy cooperation. Beijing\u2019s influence now extends well beyond the Indo-Pacific and reaches into Europe in ways Washington cannot ignore.
Xi didn\u2019t give Putin everything he sought during his meeting, though.
With the turmoil in the Middle East cutting off China\u2019s access to Middle Eastern oil and gas, Moscow sensed an opportunity to push ahead on a new pipeline, called the Power of Siberia-2<\/a>, to bring Russian gas to China.
While Putin and Xi came to a \u201cgeneral understanding<\/a> on the parameters\u201d of the project, however, no final deal was signed.
Third, China now sees itself as the central node of great-power politics.
For many decades, the United States sat at the apex of the \u201cgreat triangle\u201d, balancing between China and the Soviet Union and then Russia.
Today, the geometry has flipped. Both Trump and Putin felt compelled to come to Beijing \u2013 for stabilisation, reassurance and strategic signalling \u2013 even as they confront each other elsewhere.
China is not playing triangular diplomacy in the classic sense. It is not trying to pit Washington and Moscow against each other. Instead, it is positioning itself as the system\u2019s centre: the place where major-power diplomacy must pass, even if the outcomes are uncertain.
China is not at the apex of this arrangement because it is the strongest militarily or economically, but because it has the confidence to engage the US and Russia on its own terms.
In this new geometry, great-power politics does not revolve around Washington. Increasingly, it runs through Beijing.
Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, UNSW Sydney
Alexander Korolev does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.<\/span>
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Share articlePrint articleIt\u2019s been quite a week for Beijing, with back-to-back visits by the leaders of the United States and Russia. Chinese President Xi Jinping has had his hands full with hosting duties, gun salutes, photo opportunities and high-level talks.Each visit was important in its own way. US President Donald Trump\u2019s state visit was his […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":212805,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_genesis_hide_title":false,"_genesis_hide_breadcrumbs":false,"_genesis_hide_singular_image":false,"_genesis_hide_footer_widgets":false,"_genesis_custom_body_class":"","_genesis_custom_post_class":"","_genesis_layout":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-212804","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-world","8":"entry"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/212804","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=212804"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/212804\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/212805"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=212804"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=212804"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=212804"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}