{"id":195151,"date":"2025-12-31T02:48:46","date_gmt":"2025-12-31T02:48:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/ukraine-peace-plan-scares-the-bejesus-out-of-us-officials-say-defense-news\/"},"modified":"2025-12-31T02:48:46","modified_gmt":"2025-12-31T02:48:46","slug":"ukraine-peace-plan-scares-the-bejesus-out-of-us-officials-say-defense-news","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/ukraine-peace-plan-scares-the-bejesus-out-of-us-officials-say-defense-news\/","title":{"rendered":"Ukraine peace plan \u2018scares the bejesus out of us,\u2019 officials say – Defense News"},"content":{"rendered":"

KYIV, Ukraine \u2014 A maximum of 800,000. That\u2019s how many soldiers Ukraine\u2019s military<\/a> would be authorized to have under the current 20-point peace framework<\/a> \u2014 a 20% cut from the roughly one million currently under arms, but a significant increase over the 600,000 originally proposed.
That higher number was a concession Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy<\/a> won after weeks of pushing back. But it\u2019s still a ceiling on a force built over almost four years of war with Western weapons, Western training and Western intelligence.
Russia faces no equivalent limit.
Almost four years ago, Moscow expected Kyiv to fall in three days. Instead, Ukraine buried its dead in mass graves from Bucha<\/a> to Izium, watched Mariupol\u2019s defenders disappear into Russian filtration camps<\/a>, counted the tens of thousands of children, according to Yale\u2019s Humanitarian Research Lab<\/a>, who were taken across the border \u2014 and kept fighting.
Zelenskyy said more than 45,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed and 390,000 wounded in a February interview with Piers Morgan<\/a> \u2014 roughly 1 in 20 fighting-age men in the country, according to The Economist<\/a>.
The army that paid for every kilometer in bodies is now being asked to shrink, to cede ground it\u2019s still holding and to accept guarantees that even its allies can\u2019t explain.
It\u2019s one of many sticking points that have hounded negotiators since November \u2014 dismissed as a nonstarter by Ukrainians and treated as a baseline demand by Moscow. The 800,000 figure is supposed to be the compromise.
But the current frameworks offer little when it comes to stifling Russian hostilities, retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, former commander of U.S. Army Europe and one of NATO\u2019s most experienced voices on the alliance\u2019s Eastern flank<\/a>, told Military Times.
\u201cWho benefits from that?\u201d he told Military Times. \u201cRussia.\u201d
The framework, delivered to Moscow on Dec. 24, proposes a demilitarized zone along a line Russia hasn\u2019t captured on the battlefield, according to The Washington Post<\/a>. It offers \u201cArticle 5-like\u201d security guarantees, Hodges noted, that even U.S. officials have struggled to explain.
It also requires Ukraine to hold the line against an adversary whose answer to current peace talks, according to Zelenskyy, came in the form of nearly 500 drones and 40 missiles over Kyiv last weekend, an attack that killed two and left a third of the capital without heat, according to Reuters<\/a>. The wartime leader arrived in Mar-a-Lago the next day.
\u201cRussian representatives engage in lengthy talks,\u201d Zelenskyy posted<\/a> Saturday, \u201cbut in reality, Kinzhals and Shaheds [drones] speak for them.\u201d
The pattern continued on Monday, when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed Ukraine attacked Putin\u2019s residence in Novgorod with 91 drones overnight \u2014 an accusation Zelenskyy called a lie and \u201can attempt to undermine peace talks,\u201d according to Reuters<\/a>.
In response, Lavrov said Moscow would \u201creview\u201d its negotiating position and that targets for retaliatory strikes had already been selected.
The security architecture remains in flux, too. U.S. President Donald Trump offered Ukraine a 15-year security guarantee as part of a revised plan earlier the same day \u2014 a commitment Zelenskyy quickly called \u201cstrong\u201d but pushed to extend to 30 or 50 years, citing the war\u2019s near-15-year span since Russia\u2019s 2014 annexation of Crimea.
But the offer requires U.S. congressional ratification and European parliamentary approval, according to NPR<\/a> \u2014 a procedural hurdle that could still leave the guarantees undefined in practice.
The army Moscow expected to collapse in 72 hours is now one of the most combat-tested forces in the world.
Nearly one million Ukrainians are currently under arms, trained on NATO weapons systems, integrated into Western intelligence-sharing networks and hardened by almost four years of high-intensity conventional warfare.
They\u2019ve absorbed more battlefield lessons in drone tactics<\/a>, electronic countermeasures and decentralized command than any NATO military has learned in decades \u2014 and they\u2019ve done it under fire. This is the force the 20-point framework would cap at 20% smaller than its current size.
Hodges, who spent years planning for a potential Russian conflict from his headquarters in Wiesbaden, Germany, sees the limit as an operational straitjacket.
\u201cWhat Ukraine is being asked to do is politically and morally unacceptable,\u201d he told Military Times.
The force limits aren\u2019t just about headcount, he explained. They constrain rotation cycles, training throughput and the mobilization surge capacity Ukraine would need if the ceasefire breaks.
An army locked at 800,000 can\u2019t regenerate the way a wartime force needs to \u2014 not while holding a 600-mile front and defending cities from nightly drone barrages while Russia builds toward a 2026 recruitment target of 409,000 soldiers, military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov said in a year-end interview with Suspilne<\/a>.
Ukraine\u2019s booming drone industry is part of the equation, already outpacing the alliance it\u2019s defending. Kyiv now claims a production capacity of four million first-person-view drones annually \u2014 more than all NATO countries combined, according to Bloomberg<\/a> \u2014 with 96% built domestically, according to Defense Minister Rustem Umerov.
The asymmetry was on display in September, when at least 19 Russian drones crossed into NATO airspace over Poland. Dutch F\u201135s and Polish F\u201116s were scrambled \u2014 backed by an Italian airborne early\u2011warning aircraft, a Belgian tanker and German Patriot batteries \u2014 to successfully shoot down just four of the 19, per Air & Space Forces Magazine<\/a>.
Ian Kelly, a former U.S. ambassador to Georgia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, sees the pattern clearly.
\u201cYou can\u2019t accidentally send 20 missiles into Poland,\u201d he told Military Times. \u201cAnd that was not the first time.\u201d
The incident prompted Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk to declare that Europe is already enmeshed in \u201ca new type of war,\u201d according to The Guardian<\/a>.
While the revised 20-point version raised the troop cap, it didn\u2019t change the architecture. The army that has more experience fighting modern-day Russia than any military in NATO would still be locked into a force structure designed by Moscow \u2014 while the North Atlantic alliance watches its most capable forward buffer get gutted by the enemy it was built to stop.
A DMZ without enforcement looks just like a new front, according to Hodges. And the security guarantees now being floated don\u2019t explain who fires back when Russia tests it \u2014 which is why many Ukrainian and NATO planners like him see current proposals as a freeze, not an end.
The retired lieutenant general pointed to Dayton. That deal froze the lines in Bosnia, with American and NATO troops on the ground authorized to enforce the peace with lethal action. Twenty-five years later, that framework still holds.
But the current proposals for peace in Ukraine offer no equivalent.
\u201cWe had Minsk-1 and Minsk-2,\u201d Hodges said. \u201cYou had ceasefires, you had observers and the Russians just blew past all that. Never lived up to it.
\u201cIf there\u2019s going to be any sort of demilitarized area or a zone of separation like we had after the Dayton Peace Accords, there will have to be Europeans and Canadians in there with real capability \u2014 that have the authority to shoot back immediately when Russia violates it.\u201d
Who, Hodges posed, will then fly reconnaissance over the buffer zone? Who responds when Russia probes the line \u2014 under what authority and on what timeline? And with the contact line shifting daily even now, which day\u2019s positions get frozen?
\u201cUnless you have somebody there that\u2019s a credible deterrent, the Russians are not going to respect that,\u201d he added. \u201cAnd I don\u2019t think any serious people believe they will.\u201d
Even if the skies go quiet, the mission doesn\u2019t \u2014 temporarily stopping the war doesn\u2019t mean Ukraine can stand down. The front still has to be manned; air defense still has to cover cities and forward positions; ammunition has to keep flowing; medevac chains kept operational; rotation cycles maintained.
One senior European diplomat, granted anonymity by Military Times to discuss the sensitive negotiations, said even with a ceasefire and DMZ, the security needs of Ukraine and Europe wouldn\u2019t let up. Russia will keep probing.
\u201cThe only reason this is still called hybrid war is because we have decided to call it hybrid,\u201d he said.
The pattern is already clear: Drones have already breached NATO airspace. Sabotage plots and cyberattacks have been uncovered across the continent and the U.S. Russian probes stop just short of triggering Article 5.
\u201cWhen does it cross the line?\u201d he added. \u201cWhen do we have a Sarajevo moment?\u201d
The security guarantees are supposed to close these resource and security gaps while preventing a return to war \u2014 but they don\u2019t, the diplomat said. And everyone at the negotiating table knows it.
\u201cDoes anybody seriously believe that this administration would respond to a Russian drone attack on Ukraine as if it was a Russian drone attack on New York or Washington?\u201d Hodges asked, referring to the \u201cplatinum\u201d guarantees U.S. officials floated earlier this month.
\u201cOf course not.\u201d
Even if the guarantees hold, the math doesn\u2019t add up: Russia can afford to drag out its invasion \u2014 Ukraine can\u2019t.
World Bank figures put Russia\u2019s 2024 GDP at $2.17 trillion; Ukraine\u2019s at $190.7 billion \u2014 an 11-to-1 ratio.
Ukraine carries the highest military burden in the world, over a third of its GDP annually, according to a SIPRI<\/a> analysis. But Russia can budget to keep its war machine running long-term: Moscow used about 7.2% of its GDP on defense spending in 2025 \u2014 or 15.5 trillion rubles, roughly Ukraine\u2019s entire annual economic output.
That imbalance shapes everything that follows, including how long Russia can sustain the war, and how much outside money Ukraine needs just to stay in the fight.
If sanctions ease under any deal, Russia\u2019s defense industrial base recovers on a timeline Ukraine can\u2019t match. The money is already a fight \u2014 the EU has spent months trying to unlock frozen Russian assets, with Belgium demanding extra safeguards that have stalled the process, complicating EU efforts to turn wealth into Ukraine support at scale, according to Politico<\/a>.
The only thing that changes Putin\u2019s math is making the war too expensive to continue.
\u201cThat\u2019s how this war ends, when Russia cannot pay for what they\u2019re doing,\u201d Hodges said. \u201cAnd we won\u2019t get there by killing another half a million Russians. Putin doesn\u2019t care about that.\u201d
In his view, that means doing what European leaders have spent three years postponing: unfreezing the money in Belgium and getting it to Kyiv, putting real sanctions on Lukoil and Rosneft, going after the secondary buyers \u2014 Turkey, India and China \u2014 who keep Russia\u2019s oil revenue flowing.
Kelly explained that the only \u201cconsistent message\u201d from Washington has been \u201cthat there is no more \u2018free lunch,\u2019 no more big multi-billion dollar packages.\u201d
That leaves European allies holding both the deterrence mission and the sustainment bill without the experienced partner they built their latest defense posture around.
\u201cThe Europeans have failed,\u201d Hodges said, \u201cwhich is why Putin refers to the European leaders as \u2018piglets\u2019 \u2014 because he is pretty sure that Europeans are not going to do what\u2019s necessary.\u201d
If the West wants a peace plan that holds, he added, it has to do what the current frameworks don\u2019t: enforce violations in real time, keep Ukraine armed and funded and make the war financially unbearable for Moscow.
\u201cWhat we\u2019ve done so far hasn\u2019t delivered,\u201d the diplomat admitted. \u201cSo, how do we step up our support in a way that might impact the calculus in Moscow?\u201d
No one has answered that question yet. What they have is a framework that caps Ukraine\u2019s army, leaves enforcement undefined and asks allies to carry a burden it hasn\u2019t built the capacity to hold. It\u2019s less a peace plan than a stress test, officials say, and from where Europe sits, it\u2019s failing.
\u201cWe all see where this is heading,\u201d the diplomat said. \u201cAnd it scares the bejesus out of us.\u201d
Defense News \u00a9 2025<\/p>\n

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KYIV, Ukraine \u2014 A maximum of 800,000. That\u2019s how many soldiers Ukraine\u2019s military would be authorized to have under the current 20-point peace framework \u2014 a 20% cut from the roughly one million currently under arms, but a significant increase over the 600,000 originally proposed. That higher number was a concession Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":195152,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_genesis_hide_title":false,"_genesis_hide_breadcrumbs":false,"_genesis_hide_singular_image":false,"_genesis_hide_footer_widgets":false,"_genesis_custom_body_class":"","_genesis_custom_post_class":"","_genesis_layout":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[9],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-195151","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-us","8":"entry"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/195151","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=195151"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/195151\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/195152"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=195151"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=195151"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/quixnet.net\/wpinstance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=195151"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}