Military analyst Sean Bell is with us for the next hour answering your questions on the war in Ukraine. Submit your question in the form below.
Monday 2 December 2024 14:25, UK
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Military analyst Sean Bell says…
Thank you, Mark, for this very topical question.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the West has provided military and financial support.
However, throughout that time the West has tried to balance support to Ukraine with the threat that the war would escalate into an East vs West battle with significant consequences.
There has been significant political sensitivity over the level of support provided to Ukraine, but this nervousness has served to embolden Putin.
Putin knows that his ambitions in Ukraine could not be achieved if the West were to engage in the conflict – Russia has struggled to overcome Ukraine, which has a fraction of the military capability available to NATO.
However, this reluctance to engage will be perceived as a weakness by Putin – and also by aligned nations such as Iran, North Korea and China.
History suggests that bullies only respect strength – they exploit weakness.
Nobody wants to see the war escalate further, but appeasement is almost certainly not the best way to avoid such an outcome, especially in the long-term.
Military analyst Sean Bell says…
Thanks, Billy.
Earlier on in the conflict, many military experts believed that Crimea represented a “centre of gravity” for Vladimir Putin – something he would never accept losing.
Therefore, if Ukraine had been able to isolate Crimea and potentially seize it back from Russian occupation, Russia could be minded to negotiate an end to the conflict in terms favourable to Ukraine.
The Kursk road/rail bridge would have been a prime target as this was a primary arterial logistics route for Russia.
However, since that time Russia has secured most of the land bridge from Russia to Crimea and is therefore significantly less reliant on the Kursk bridge for logistic support to Crimea and its occupying forces.
As a result, mindful that Ukraine is short of munitions, the bridge is probably not a priority for Ukrainian targeting at this time.
Military analyst Sean Bell says…
Thank you, Gary.
Although president-elect Donald Trump has made several comments in advance of his inauguration on 20 January next year, it is not yet clear how these ideas will be reflected in future US policy.
NATO remains a very powerful and credible military capability and serves as a deterrent to would-be aggressors.
It has proven incredibly effective at ensuring the protection of NATO members for many decades and continues to attract new members.
Although NATO represents a very powerful military capability by mass, its weakness is that it is a “coalition of the willing” and as we have seen during the Ukraine war, each nation has a very different appetite for risk.
And, Trump is likely to be focused on China and leave Europe to take more leadership in dealing with the Russia threat.
However, that does not mean that the NATO alliance is any less credible, and I suspect Trump will provide greater clarity over his intent following his inauguration.
Military analyst Sean Bell says…
Thanks, Piotr, for this very topical question.
In short, although there is always a faint risk of escalation, the short answer is that the threat of a European escalation is very, very slim.
Although we had assumed before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 that it had a credible and dangerous military capability, it has struggled to overcome Ukraine and has lost a significant proportion of its military equipment and capability over the last two years.
As a result, it will be several years before Russia has rearmed and is ready to present a significant threat to a much stronger European continent.
However, if Putin believes that the benefits of future military action outweigh the risks, he is likely to feel emboldened to continue his aggression.
Military analyst Sean Bell says…
Thanks, Joan, for this very topical question.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, Ukraine found itself the third biggest nuclear power in the world.
The Soviet leadership had previously forward-deployed many of its nuclear weapons onto Ukrainian territory, and although the Ukrainians did not have the launch codes for these weapons, it was widely believed that Ukraine would eventually find a way to bypass these issues.
In an effort to resolve concerns around nuclear proliferation, the US, the UK and Russia agreed to guarantee Ukrainian sovereignty in return for relinquishing their nuclear arsenal.
This negotiation concluded with the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. However, less than two decades later, Russia reneged on that agreement and invaded Crimea, and the US and UK failed to take decisive action to fulfill their 1994 obligations around Ukrainian sovereignty.
If Ukraine had retained its nuclear weapons at the end of the Cold War, it is very unlikely that Russia would have considered a full-scale invasion in 2022.
Following Russia’s decision to forward-deploy nuclear weapons into Belarus last year, a precedent has been set and it raised the prospect that the West might consider a similar deployment of nuclear capability into Ukraine.
Although such a move would be seen by Russia as a clear escalation, it could have provided Ukraine with the ultimate deterrent against further Russian aggression.
However – and this is a significant caveat – to my knowledge there has been no further move to enact such a deployment.
Unlike Russia’s clear provocation by forward-deploying nuclear weapons into Belarus, the West appears to be looking at more measured ways to help Ukraine.
Military analyst Sean Bell says…
Thanks, Jason. Ultimately, the only person who knows the answer to that question is Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
However, mindful that Zelenskyy has proven very adept at leveraging international media to maintain a focus on the conflict with Russia, this most recent interview with Sky News was almost certainly not conducted “off the cuff”.
You can watch that interview in full below…
What we do know is that Ukraine is being pushed back on the frontline, its military is running short of ammunition and weapons, and the rising number of casualties is making it increasingly difficult to withstand the highly attritional Russian onslaught.
To date, Zelenskyy has made clear that he is not prepared to negotiate with Putin without some guarantees about Ukraine’s long-term security.
Under Joe Biden’s tenure, US military and financial support was provided to ensure Ukraine did not lose the war, whereas it appears that president-elect Donald Trump’s objective is to bring the war to an end.
Therefore, Zelenskyy is probably reviewing his negotiating strategy in preparation for Trump’s inauguration on 20 January.
Of note were Zelenskyy’s comments that land was significantly less important than people – and his priority was to ensure the long-term security and prosperity of the Ukrainian people.
Military analyst Sean Bell says…
Thanks, Rosa, for a question that is becoming more topical by the day.
Since the fall of the former Soviet Union, the UK has reduced its defence spending commensurate with the perceived “peace dividend”.
The UK military was still deployed to conflicts around the world, but these were wars of choice and conducted as expeditionary warfare. The UK Armed Forces deployed military power overseas and configured its forces accordingly.
Although Russia and China were “driving threats” that helped define UK military requirements, few anticipated that Russia would conduct a large-scale invasion of its neighbour.
The consequences of Putin’s unprovoked aggression in Ukraine will have profound and long-term implications for national security, well beyond the immediate geographic boundaries of the current conflict.
However, there is no quick fix to addressing 30 years of low defence spending, which is why the UK Strategic Defence Review has been commissioned to inform a fresh approach to meeting the UK’s future defence needs.
Although the UK political narrative is focused on increasing defence spending to 2.5% GDP at some stage in the future, most military experts believe that a significantly greater investment will be required to develop a credible and robust national defence strategy.
The UK needs to reconfigure its military capability – both nuclear and conventional – to enable the UK to demonstrate a credible military deterrence posture that will not only deter a potential adversary, but also ensure the UK prevails if conflict cannot be avoided.
Although this appears a worthy ambition, addressing decades of underfunding will require significant investment.
The UK fiscal environment precludes large investments in defence without making very difficult choices elsewhere – although it is worth reiterating that the number one priority of any government is the protection of its people, so investment should be prioritised accordingly.
In the near term, Russia has paid a huge price for its invasion of Ukraine and it will be several years before it has refreshed its stocks of military equipment, ammunition and personnel to enable it to pose a threat to the West.
Furthermore, nations geographically closer to Russia will undoubtedly feel an increased degree of urgency, which all contribute to UK’s layered defences.
But this only provides a very small window of opportunity for the UK to respond and rebuild its defences. Fail to pay our premiums, and we will not have effective insurance against an increasingly unpredictable and dangerous world.
Military analyst Sean Bell says…
Ever since Iran launched a massive ballistic missile attack against Israel, there has been growing concern about the UK’s ability to protect itself against a similar attack.
Military capability is expensive: equipment must be modern, robust, survivable and upgradeable, and matched to well-trained and motivated military personnel, logistics support and a host of other supporting elements.
As a result, national investment in military capability is guided by threat – both near and longer-term – and for the past three decades there has not been a credible military threat to the UK requiring a layered air defence capability.
It is worth pointing out that if the UK were to be targeted by missiles, these weapons would have to fly over our NATO allies before getting to our island shores. Therefore, our membership of the NATO alliance provides a robust defence against such a threat.
In terms of national capability, the first requirement is to detect and track incoming missiles. RAF Fylingdales is a UK radar base and is also part of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. It is designed to give the British and US governments warning of an impending ballistic missile attack (part of the so-called four-minute warning during the Cold War).
In addition, the UK has 24/7 fighter-jet capability – Quick Reaction Alert – that can shoot down cruise missiles, and the Royal Navy also has missile defence capability.
During the Cold War, the UK was protected from missile attack by numerous Bloodhound missiles that were based across the country.
However, modern ballistic missiles require high-tech (and expensive) defensive capability to intercept these hypersonic weapons – this is just one example of where the lack of investment in the UK armed forces over the past 30 years has left a vulnerability.
But, with a US Patriot system costing around $1bn per unit, the UK will not be able to address this vulnerability any time soon without a step-change in investment.
Military analyst Sean Bell says…
Thanks, Brian, for this very interesting question.
As the war between Russia and Ukraine moves past 1,000 days, both sides are struggling to maintain the tempo of full-scale war.
Russia has ramped up its defence industrial base in an attempt to meet its military demands but has still had to turn to Iran and North Korea to secure supplies of ammunition and missiles.
Ukraine has turned to the West to supply air defence capability and also a range of weapons and ammunition to combat the Russian invasion.
However, both sides are also struggling to mobilise sufficient troops in response to Russia’s highly attritional style of warfare.
Russia has conducted a round of mobilisation but Putin appears very reluctant to repeat the process for fear of undermining domestic support for the war.
Instead, Russia turned initially to the Wagner mercenary group to bolster its land forces, which was then bolstered further by recruiting criminals into the Russian frontline.
Russia has also secured the support of thousands of international mercenaries through the provision of lucrative contracts; however, the high (and growing) casualty rates have dramatically reduced the flow of volunteers, so Russia has turned to North Korea for additional support.
Ukraine is also struggling to mobilise sufficient soldiers for its defensive requirements. Regardless of whatever measures Russia takes, the West has – to date – been reluctant to commit combatants to the war with Russia.
Putin consistently tries to frame the war as a conflict between Russia and NATO, but as Ukraine is not a member, it cannot call upon NATO for help.
There is little doubt that if the West was to get involved directly in this conflict it would overwhelm Russia’s military.
But that would be a significant escalation and there is currently limited political appetite in the West for such an option. However, if Russia was to gain momentum in the war and the prospects for Ukraine looked increasingly bleak, it is possible that individual European nations might decide to engage directly to stop Russia from prevailing.
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