Dec. 15 (Asia Today) — Foreign Affairs, a publication that holds outsized influence in U.S. foreign policy debates, published an essay last month arguing that” nuclear armament by Canada, Germany and Japan could stabilize the international order.”
The piece, which is widely seen as offering a favorable assessment of Japanese nuclear armament, underscores a growing view that the United States may no longer be able to sustain its role as the “ultimate nuclear guarantor” in every region. The resulting shift is also pushing South Korea’s long-sensitive nuclear debate into the realm of practical policy.
The essay was written by two University of Oklahoma scholars, Moritz S. Graefrath and Mark A. Raymond. Beyond the argument itself, the fact that Foreign Affairs carried it is notable. It signals that in U.S. strategic circles, the idea that a trusted ally could acquire nuclear weapons to share regional defense burdens is no longer treated as off-limits.
The discussion of Japan stands out. The authors argue that an uclear-armed Japan could contribute to stability in East Asia and help supplement U.S. extended deterrence.
Related
They also refer to South Korea, but in a notably more cautious tone. The distinction – Japan framed as a “desirable option,” and South Korea as a “possible option if it insists” – suggests a hierarchy in how U.S. strategic thinking weighs nuclear pathways for Tokyo and Seoul.
The argument for Japan, however, leaves out a major factor: history. Since 1945, the international order has treated Germany and Japan as war-responsible nations, tightly constraining their military expansion. Germany’s renewed defense buildup, justified largely by the threat from Russia, has not erased anxieties in Europe. If Berlin were to pursue nuclear weapons, neighbors such as Poland and the Czech Republic would likely see it as an existential threat.
A similar dynamic applies in East Asia. If Japan were to acquire nuclear weapons, South Korea would face the sharpest strategic pressure. Given historical disputes, territorial issues and gaps in threat perception between Seoul and Tokyo, the claim that Japanese nuclear weapons would “protect” South Korea is difficult to sustain. From Seoul’s perspective, Japanese nuclear armament could instead become a destabilizing variable that shakes its security environment.
Still, the direction of U.S. discourse is clear. With isolationist sentiment spreading, fiscal pressures mounting and Washington competing with China and Russia at the same time, the United States is pressing allies to assume greater security responsibilities. The view that the nuclear umbrella is not a public good that will be provided automatically forever is increasingly heard in Washington.
That leaves South Korea with narrowing choices. As confidence in U.S. extended deterrence weakens, North Korea has already fielded operational nuclear forces. If Japan’s nuclear potential were added to the equation, South Korea could find itself as the only non-nuclear state in Northeast Asia, alongside China, Russia, North Korea and Japan – a strategic vacuum.
In that context, South Korea’s nuclear armament debate is no longer simply emotional or ideological. Mainstream U.S. discussion is now raising the concept of “selective nuclear proliferation.” The question is whether South Korea will be pulled along by this shift or move first to shape the conditions and framework under which it responds.
Chung Seong-jang, deputy director of the Sejong Institute, said in an interview on Dec. 14 that trust in the global nuclear nonproliferation regime is eroding to the point that major U.S. foreign policy outlets are voicing support for nuclear armament by Canada and by war-responsible countries such as Germany and Japan.
To avoid what he called a worst-case outcome – in which those countries pursue nuclear arms while South Korea remains the only non-nuclear state in Northeast Asia – Chung urged Seoul to revise the ROK-U.S. nuclear agreement to secure capabilities comparable to Japan’s, including uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing.
What South Korea needs now, the argument goes, is not slogans but a hard calculation of a nuclear self-reliance strategy. If Washington begins to weaken the long-standing taboo on nuclear proliferation, South Korea’s silence on nuclear self-reliance can no longer serve as a strategy.
– Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI
© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.
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Dec. 15 (Asia Today) — Foreign Affairs, a publication that holds outsized influence in U.S. foreign policy debates, published an essay last month arguing that” nuclear armament by Canada, Germany and Japan could stabilize the international order.”
The piece, which is widely seen as offering a favorable assessment of Japanese nuclear armament, underscores a growing view that the United States may no longer be able to sustain its role as the “ultimate nuclear guarantor” in every region. The resulting shift is also pushing South Korea’s long-sensitive nuclear debate into the realm of practical policy.
The essay was written by two University of Oklahoma scholars, Moritz S. Graefrath and Mark A. Raymond. Beyond the argument itself, the fact that Foreign Affairs carried it is notable. It signals that in U.S. strategic circles, the idea that a trusted ally could acquire nuclear weapons to share regional defense burdens is no longer treated as off-limits.
The discussion of Japan stands out. The authors argue that an uclear-armed Japan could contribute to stability in East Asia and help supplement U.S. extended deterrence.
Related
They also refer to South Korea, but in a notably more cautious tone. The distinction – Japan framed as a “desirable option,” and South Korea as a “possible option if it insists” – suggests a hierarchy in how U.S. strategic thinking weighs nuclear pathways for Tokyo and Seoul.
The argument for Japan, however, leaves out a major factor: history. Since 1945, the international order has treated Germany and Japan as war-responsible nations, tightly constraining their military expansion. Germany’s renewed defense buildup, justified largely by the threat from Russia, has not erased anxieties in Europe. If Berlin were to pursue nuclear weapons, neighbors such as Poland and the Czech Republic would likely see it as an existential threat.
A similar dynamic applies in East Asia. If Japan were to acquire nuclear weapons, South Korea would face the sharpest strategic pressure. Given historical disputes, territorial issues and gaps in threat perception between Seoul and Tokyo, the claim that Japanese nuclear weapons would “protect” South Korea is difficult to sustain. From Seoul’s perspective, Japanese nuclear armament could instead become a destabilizing variable that shakes its security environment.
Still, the direction of U.S. discourse is clear. With isolationist sentiment spreading, fiscal pressures mounting and Washington competing with China and Russia at the same time, the United States is pressing allies to assume greater security responsibilities. The view that the nuclear umbrella is not a public good that will be provided automatically forever is increasingly heard in Washington.
That leaves South Korea with narrowing choices. As confidence in U.S. extended deterrence weakens, North Korea has already fielded operational nuclear forces. If Japan’s nuclear potential were added to the equation, South Korea could find itself as the only non-nuclear state in Northeast Asia, alongside China, Russia, North Korea and Japan – a strategic vacuum.
In that context, South Korea’s nuclear armament debate is no longer simply emotional or ideological. Mainstream U.S. discussion is now raising the concept of “selective nuclear proliferation.” The question is whether South Korea will be pulled along by this shift or move first to shape the conditions and framework under which it responds.
Chung Seong-jang, deputy director of the Sejong Institute, said in an interview on Dec. 14 that trust in the global nuclear nonproliferation regime is eroding to the point that major U.S. foreign policy outlets are voicing support for nuclear armament by Canada and by war-responsible countries such as Germany and Japan.
To avoid what he called a worst-case outcome – in which those countries pursue nuclear arms while South Korea remains the only non-nuclear state in Northeast Asia – Chung urged Seoul to revise the ROK-U.S. nuclear agreement to secure capabilities comparable to Japan’s, including uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing.
What South Korea needs now, the argument goes, is not slogans but a hard calculation of a nuclear self-reliance strategy. If Washington begins to weaken the long-standing taboo on nuclear proliferation, South Korea’s silence on nuclear self-reliance can no longer serve as a strategy.
– Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI
© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.